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HEADQUARTERS  
BERLIN COMMAND  
Office of the AC of S, G2

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN COMMAND  
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY  
Period Ending-232400 Nov 61  
(ISUM #15) (U)

G2

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Opn	
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1. (S) SOVIET FORCES:

A Soviet convoy of UAZ 450A ambulances, GAZ-51 bus, GAZ-69, Z-164, 30 Z-164N each towing trailer, 17 MAZ-502 tractor trucks each with semi-trailer and 2 Z-585 dump trucks moved north on Cottbus Autobahn, vicinity of Lueben (VT 2455) Cutoff, 15 November. Observer stated that vehicles appeared new.

Convoy of 19 Z-164N each towing trailer, Z-164, Z-585 dump truck, GAZ-69 (all without VRN's); 3 MAZ 200, ambulance, bus, 2 cargo trucks (all with VRN's) observed moving north in vicinity of HERZBERG (UT 7828) on 18 November.

COMMENT: Vehicles are the latest Soviet production models. The introduction of new improved models indicates possible modernization and expansion of GSFG logistical capability. Convoys were possibly the movement of equipment and supplies in connection with exercise believed to have been conducted in Dresden-Cottbus area 14-18 November.

2. (C) EAST GERMAN ARMY FORCES:

Elements of one East German Army Engineer Battalion moved into East Berlin on 19 November. The exact identification of this unit was not determined, but it is very likely that this unit was subordinate to the 1st Motorized Rifle Division which has its headquarters in Potsdam. There are no known separate EGA engineer battalions in the Berlin Ring.

3. (C) GARRISON SECURITY FORCES:

Defectors from 6th Border Command (BC) Regiment, Schoneberg, (PE 2768), 1st BC Regiment Muehlhausen (PB 0375), and 4th BC Regiment Dermbach (NB 7919) report all leaves were cancelled

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BY AUTHORITY OF:

*Louis A. Waple*  
LOUIS A. WAPLE, Lt Col, GS

G2, Berlin Command

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*M-876/1*

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Para 3 (C) (cont)

as of 15 Nov 61. (F-1) Rumored reasons for cancellation are BC participation in EGA maneuvers and imminent signing of Soviet-East German peace treaty. (F-6)

COMMENT: Alert status apparently involves entire Border Command. No indication that alert involves EGA or Security Alert Police (SAP) except for single report that 9th SAP Regiment at Chemnitz (US 5436) must be "Combat Ready" by 15 Nov. Numerous defector reports from I Border Guard Brigade (SAP) in East Berlin and II Border Guard Brigade (SAP) at Gross Glienicke indicate these units not involved in alert of BC units. In addition, defectors from EGA engineer battalions constructing barbed wire fences along East-West German border indicate their units will continue construction work until late December.

Many BC units still understrength and reorganizing; hence, alert status of BC units does not greatly improve operational capability for other than normal border guard duties.

BC units are normally placed on general alert status to insure availability of all able-bodied members of unit. It is unusual for only BC to be placed on alert status. This is apparently an indication only the border area was involved. Exercise activity can only be accepted as likely cause of present alert in the context of an exercise involving almost all border areas. Exercise of this magnitude would be one involving Warsaw Pact Forces.

While participation in a major maneuver is possible, it is doubtful that more than token BC forces would be withdrawn from border regiments. Their actual role during Warsaw Pact exercise might be to insure border area is not violated by maneuver forces.

4. (C) ACCESS SITUATION:

a. (C) Railways:

(1). On 23 Nov 61, a US train bound for Frankfurt enroute from Berlin with Allied personnel aboard was released after being detained for approximately 14 hours by Soviet and East German personnel at Marienborn.

COMMENT: A male refugee was aboard the train when it entered Marienborn. Passage through Marienborn was denied until the refugee was surrendered. He was released to East German authorities at approximately 1315 hours, the train was then released and continued to Frankfurt without further incident.

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Para 4. (C) (Cont)

(2). 40 S-Bahn employees, who live in East Berlin and work in West Berlin S-Bahn installations, reportedly were prohibited from entering West Berlin on 14 November. While the report is unconfirmed, it was ascertained that 21 East Berlin residents employed in British sector S-Bahn stations failed to appear for work.

COMMENT: Previously reported that Reichsbahn Directorate (S-Bahn is part of East German Reichsbahn) has plan to reduce number of East Berliners and East Germans still working in West Berlin in order to minimize opportunities for defection. Single men in particular are said to be involved. This report may indicate the plan is now in action.

b. (C) AUTOBAHN:

It was reported on 21 November 61 that at the Babelsburg Checkpoint, 2 steel barriers have been erected on the side of the Autobahn leading to Berlin. The first barrier is located on the right side of the double lane, 35 meters in front of the last drop barrier. The second barrier is located 20 meters in front of the last drop barrier. The barriers are erected so that the driver must slow down and drive in a weaving manner. The barriers are constructed of 2 steel beams embedded in concrete with a third steel beam welded in horizontal fashion to the two embedded beams. The height of the barrier is approximately 1.5 meters.

COMMENT: Construction is in logical sequence to East German Communist measures to "secure" the National Border of the East German State. The practical purpose of the barriers appears to be for the prevention of further refugee crash-throughs, since the barriers are merely a means to slow down traffic.

c. (C) East Berlin:

(1). At 192110 Nov 61, a US Reconnaissance Patrol vehicle was detained by VoPo personnel in two BMW automobiles. The patrol was detained in the vicinity of Oberbaum Brucke Bridge on Rudolf Strasse. The patrol was threatened by a VoPo with an AK machine gun and the radio antenna on the car was hacked off. The patrol was unable to ask for a Soviet Officer as the VoPos moved back away from the area. The patrol was released at 2235 hours.

(2). At 201000 Nov 61, a US Reconnaissance Patrol vehicle was detained by VoPos in the vicinity of Griefstrasse and Stern Damm on a dead-end street. The VoPo vehicle blocked

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Para 4. (C) (cont)

their exit, and the patrol vehicle bumped the VoPo vehicle slightly. The VoPos dismounted from their vehicle in rage and tore off a windshield wiper blade from the patrol vehicle and attempted to force open a vent window. Seeing no driver in the VoPo vehicle the patrol vehicle departed the area. The total time of detention was approximately 15 minutes.

(3). At 201415 Nov 61, a Staff Visit sedan was boxed in for approximately 2 minutes by 2 East German vehicles carrying occupants in civilian clothes. The detention occurred on Landsberger Strasse approximately 300 meters west of Weissenseer Strasse. 2 men dismounted from the front vehicle. One of the men was carrying a small "Road Closed" sign which he used as a club to break off the antenna on the top of the sedan. The vehicle was then released and continued without incident.

G2 COMMENT: It is believed that these civilians were State Security Ministry (MfS) personnel. It has been customary for MfS to "tail" US reconnaissance vehicles, but this is the first occasion of violence displayed by these personnel against US patrols.

5. (C) HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE:

Hostile reconnaissance patrols continue to maintain surveillance of installations in the American Sector of West Berlin. The approximate average remains about 4 Soviet vehicles per day.

6. (C) REFUGEES:

During this period, an approximate average of 25 refugees per day were processed at the Marienfelde Refugee Center. This is a slight increase since the last reporting period.

7. (C) POPULATION ATTITUDES:

a. Discussions of the S-Bahn boycott in recent weeks have been increasing in frequency and intensity in all sectors of West Berlin. In the opinion of some observers, West Berliners are beginning to feel that the effects of the boycott on the East German regime are minimal when compared to the extra inconvenience and expense which West Berliners must bear in order to make it effective. It is widely rumored that the West Berlin transportation authority would not object to attempts to end the boycott as the local transportation system is operating with increasing deficits and some problems of assuring uninterrupted service with the deficit appear to be insurmountable.

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Para 7. (C) (cont)

b. There is a growing concern among West Berliners concerning the East-West parcel post traffic for the coming holidays. It is feared in some quarters that the East German regime will cut off this type of mail service. For many families this will be seriously demoralizing and could lead to some public protests.

8. (C) PROPAGANDA:

The 21 Nov edition of Neues Deutschland, the East German SED newspaper, propagandizes the East German actions of 19 November as "barriers to armor", "good protection against planned provocations" and as an "answer to the provocative demands recently made by members of the Bonn government and other militarists."

G2 COMMENT: Wall around the Brandenburg Gate and tank obstacles are believed to be measures designed to sell their propaganda theme that the wall is a "necessary defensive measure" rather than a preventive against refugee escapes.

9. (C) OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS:

The highlights of this reporting period commenced during the evening of 19 November with construction of a new reinforced concrete wall and anti-tank obstacles on the sector/sector border. The East Germans have built new barriers and reinforced the walls from Bernauer Strasse north of the Brandenburg Gate to Freidrich Strasse which is south of the Brandenburg Gate. Between Brandenburg Gate and Potsdamer Platz a double row of anti-tank obstacles in the form of iron bars and concrete blocks were installed. The Brandenburg Gate was completely walled off by a semi-circular wall positioned on the west side of the Gate. (See Incl 1 & 2 )(U)

10. (C) NEW MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION:

The 8 wheel armored personnel carrier displayed in the 7 Nov 61 parade in Moscow appears equipped with infrared driver's lights and possibly with infrared commander's light. 21 T-54s equipped with infrared lights for commander, driver and gunner were displayed in same parade.

COMMENT: Infrared drivers lights are extensively used on Soviet tanks, self-propelled antiaircraft guns and amphibious scout cars. Equipping new armored personnel carrier with lights is further indications of importance given night movement by Soviets. Soviets probably intend to use this new armored carrier in night combat in conjunction with tanks.

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11. (C) NEW UNIT IDENTIFICATION:

No new unit identifications were made during the period.

12. (C) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

During this reporting period, there were 21 ground reconnaissance patrols dispatched to East Berlin; 49 Staff Tours were made in East Berlin; 7 helicopter flights were made over the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders; 3 helicopter photographic reconnaissance missions were flown over the <sup>BABELSBERG</sup> Mariensberg Checkpoint; 14 ground reconnaissance patrols were made of the sector/sector border from the American side; and 7 ground reconnaissance patrols were made along the sector/zonal border.

13. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. (U) Security:

(1). During this reporting period, the G2 Security Branch conducted a test and demonstration at Yankee Stadium, Andrews Barracks using the M3 and M4 document destroyer, emergency, incendiary. The kits, previously issued to those units and divisions having the bulk of classified documents in the Command, in most cases had not been opened or tested in the Command. The demonstration showed the effectiveness of the kits.

(2). M3 Document Destroyer: Issued on the basis of 1 each for each 70 pounds of cryptologic or other classified documents outside the CONUS (SB725-1300-1). The M3 is a sodium nitrate kit designed specifically for the emergency destruction of bound and unbound cryptologic and other classified documents. Utilizing a 55 gallon drum, requisitioned through local engineer facilities, old issues of telephone books were destroyed with 100% effectiveness. However, in order to expedite destruction, all divisions who have been issued the M3 kits, should open them, checking especially the bags containing the sodium nitrate, as any form of moisture condensation tends to harden the sodium nitrate. These should be broken up, replaced in the barrel-type container and stored in a moisture free room. In a test prior to the scheduled demonstration, an M3 kit, which had been stored at Tempelhof over 10 years was used revealing that the time element did not depreciate the effectiveness of the document destroyer.

(3). M4 File Destroyer: Issued on a basis of 1 each for each 4-drawer file cabinet containing classified documents, when authorized by commanders outside the CONUS only (SB 725-1300-1).

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Para 13. (U) (cont)

The M4 is a cellulose nitrate-sodium nitrate kit that provides for interlacing the cellulose nitrate with the contents of the drawers in a file cabinet. Ignition is accomplished by electrical squibs (flashlight batteries, electrical current, etc). Utilizing a wooden file cabinet, which is not authorized to store classified material, the demonstration showed how effective the kit would work using a metal cabinet (AR 380-5), as the wooden cabinet burned itself out prior to 100% effectiveness for destruction. The drawers of the metal file cabinet should be closed as the oxidizer boxes furnish the oxygen necessary for complete destruction.

(4). In another test, the BC Chemical Division demonstrated the hand grenade, An-M14. This test revealed the ineffectiveness of the grenade in the destruction of classified papers by burning downward too rapidly. This thermite incendiary grenade is to be used for the emergency destruction of crypto equipment, classified equipment, in addition to other uses prescribed by the Chemical Corps.

14. (C) MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Steinstucken Exclave:

(1). Patrol reliefs of the US Army 3-man patrols were conducted on the 17th and 23rd of November without incident.

(2). Construction on the fence along both sides of the access road leading into Steinstucken from the American Sector has not yet been started.

15. (C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:

The construction of a new reinforced concrete wall and anti-tank obstacles on the sector/sector border, extending north of Brandenburg Gate to south of Friedrich Strasse was the highlight of this period. Photographs showing the construction and obstacles are as follows:

Inclosure 1 (U)

<u>Photo Nr.</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coord.</u>
1.	Ebert Strasse north of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899192
2.	Ebert Strasse south of Brandenburg Gate	UU 899196
3.	Lenne and Ebert Strasse north of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899193
4.	Ebert and Voss Strasse north of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899193

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Para 15. (C) (cont)

<u>Photo Nr.</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Coord.</u>
5.	Ebert Strasse north of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899192
6.	Potsdamer Platz	UU 899192
7.	South edge of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899191
8.	Stresseman Strasse southeast of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899191
9.	Kotbener and Stresseman Strasse southeast of Potsdamer Platz	UU 899189
10.	Zimmer and Wilhelm Strasse	UU 904189
11.	Zimmer and Wilhelm Strasse	UU 904188
12.	Zimmer Strasse, 1/2 block west of Checkpoint Charlie	UU 906189
13.	Checkpoint Charlie	UU 907189
14.	Zimmer and Charlotten Strasse	UU 909189
15.	Markgrafen and Zimmer Strasse	UU 911189
16.	Jerusalmer and Zimmer Strasse	UU 913189

Inclosure 2 (U)

1.	Ebert Strasse from river south to Simon Strasse	UU 899201
2.	North side of Brandenburg Gate	UU 899199
3.	Wall to west of Brandenburg Gate	UU 899198
3a.	" " " " " " "	"
4.	Brandenburg Gate	"
5.	" " "	"
6.	" " "	"
7.	" " "	"
8.	Potsdamer Platz	UU 899192
9.	" "	"
10.	" "	"

Incl: a/s

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SOURCE OF MATERIAL UTILIZED IN THE PREPARATION OF ISUM #15

- para 1a - DISUM 191
- 2 - G2 (Capt O'Mary)
- 3 - DISC 188
- 4a1 - G2 Journal
- 4a2 - DISC 188
- 4b - DISC 192
- 4c1 - G2 Journal
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- 8 - IO/USCOB. Warnings & Sensitive Sources.
- 9 - G2 Journal
- 10. <sup>3</sup> DISC 189
- 11. - G2
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